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Abstract: Oil prices have tumbled after Saudi Arabia and its allies cut ties with Qatar, 
sparking anxiety that OPEC’s fragile deal to curtail oil production could come undone. Also 
and although its daily oil output of around 600,000 barrels represents less than one percent of 
world crude production, Qatar is a major player in liquefied natural gas. This means that the 
current deterioration in relations among the Middle East neighbours would have significant 
implications for oil and gas markets.This paper is novel in its methodological approach, which 
is used to decompose the variance of oil stock price indices into contributions from country-
specific uncertainty and uncertainty common to all countries. The analysis reveals that the 
contributing factors have varied over time. Prior to the blockade on Qatar, the region-specific 
uncertainty plays an important role in driving the volatility of oil and gas shares for all cases. 
In considering the post‐ boycott, an increasing importance of the country-specific uncertainty 
factor is shown. This suggests GCC states that have long resisted making a collective effort to 
accomplish energy security, are now moving into a new era during which securing their own 
supply routes will be an indispensable part of their mode of operation. To strengthen energy 
cooperation, it is first necessary to rebuild trust. 
Keywords : Qatar diplomatic crisis, oil and gas markets, region-specific uncertainty, country-
specific uncertainty. 
JEL classification : C15, C32, E32, G11, G15.   
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1. Introduction 
For several decades, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
1
 have been a pillar of the 
global energy market for their wealth of resources and political stability. Nevertheless, their 
contemporary infighting might prompt a strategic shift in how the world looks at the 
geopolitics of the GCC. The collective decision by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Bahrain and Egypt to cut diplomatic and economic ties with Qatar on 5 June 2017 has 
rattled nerves, sending shockwaves around the world. These unprecedented tensions have 
exacerbated the uncertainty over the ultimate economic consequences of this crisis. The 
Qatari stock market lost about 10 percent in market value over the first four weeks of the 
boycott. Other GCC stock markets also fell in response to the blockade, though with varying 
extent.  The Qatar’s blockade disrupted supply chains, harmed the flow of goods and services, 
and caused widespread devastation among companies in the region. Many businesses feared 
that escalating tensions in the region could have serious consequences on some business deals 
and companies in the region. The most immediate impacts of increased uncertainty over Qatar 
crisis on businesses were debated intensively since the announcement of Qatar’s isolation. 
Nevertheless, its implications for oil and gas markets are still unaddressed. As far as the 
impact of geopolical risk on oil and gas markets is concerned, to the best of our knowledge, 
no studies have emphasized the contribution of country-specific and region-specific 
uncertainty in determining oil and gas price indices. 
The 2017 edition of the “BP Statistical Review of World Energy” indicates that the 
GCC countries are peerless sources of energy resources. Altogether, the six controlled a 29 
percent of proven oil reserves in 2017, and about 41 percent of total reserves held by 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). It must be mentioned at this 
stage that of the six GCC states, only Oman and Bahrain are not members of OPEC. These 
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The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is a political and economic alliance of six Middle Eastern countries, 
namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. 
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two countries, however, follow OPEC’s production and its price strategies. With a global oil 
share of 15.6 percent, Saudi Arabia is still the second major source of proven reserves after 
Venezuela. Saudi Arabia appears as the greatest regional power, because of its massive 
oil wealth. Nevertheless, the economy of Saudi Arabia is entirely based on oil. The drop in oil 
prices since June 2014 created a certain obsession among Saudis with economic and political 
decline.The global share of oil reserves of the rest of Gulf countries is nearly 13.4 percent (in 
particular, Kuwait with 5.9 per cent, the UAE with 5.7 per cent, Qatar with 1.5 percent and 
Oman with 0.3 percent). With respect production, GCC states contributed by about 24.4 
percent of global oil output in 2016.The UAE and Kuwait are important oil producing 
countries, accounting respectively for nearly 4.4 percent and 3.4 percent of the global oil 
output. Similarly, GCC countries are considered as potential players in natural gas, accounting 
for almost 22.6 percent of reserves in 2016. Qatar boasts 24.3 trillion cubic meters of proven 
gas reserves, the third biggest in the world. Qatar is the major exporter of liquefied natural 
gas, mostly to Asian and European countries and the United States through long-term 
contracts. Besides, natural gas reserves of other Gulf states cannot be ignored. Saudi Arabia 
with 4.4 percent, the UAE with 3.3 percent, Kuwait with 1 percent, Oman with 0.4 percent 
and Bahrain with 0.1 percent. Gulf countries still depend substantially on the energy sector for 
the well-being of their economies. This was well noticed when oil prices witnessed a sharp 
decline in mid-2014, resulting in budgetary shortages and forcing a streamlining of public 
sector expenditures and rolling back subsidies. It is important to remember that GCC states 
have often been aware of the importance of reducing their economies’ reliance on the 
hydrocarbon sector. 
Given the rising political uncertainty over Qatar crisis, it is important to provide a 
basic understanding of how uncertainty might influence the economy by offering numerous 
mechanisms through which uncertainties are transmitted to the economy. Uncertainty can 
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exert a significant influence on the macroeconomy depending on whether it reflects 
exogenous factors like natural disasters or geopolitical risks perceived as a source of 
macroeconomic fluctuations, or whether it emerges as an endogenous reaction to other 
potential macroeconomic drivers, including aggregate demand shocks or aggregate supply 
shocks. In fact, high uncertainty can transmit through the macroeconomy by influencing 
spending decisions of households and firms, leading for instance to suspend consumption and 
investment, and harming financial markets if the anticipated asset price volatility raises risk 
premia which are thereafter transmitted to great cost of credit to households and industries. 
Moreover, the economic policy uncertainty may have a substantial impact on the 
appropriateness and the efficacy of economic policies. For example, economic downturns 
characterised by a increased uncertainty might necessitate a deeper monetary policy 
stimulation package to effectively support the economy. Consequently, individual and 
institutional investors, governments and central bank officials have long considered 
heightened uncertainty indispensable determinant of macroeconomic fluctuations (inter alia: 
Arnold and Vrugt 2008; Bloom 2009, 2014; Bernal et al. 2014; Christiano et al. 2014; Liu and 
Zhang 2015; Carney 2016). Arnold and Vrugt (2008), Bernal et al. (2014), and Liu and Zhang 
(2015) show that there exists a positive relationship between policy uncertainty and stock 
market volatility. Heightened uncertainty also prompts a decline in investment, as claimed by 
Kang et al. (2014) and Gulen and Ion (2016). In addition, Tax adjustments, regional conflict, 
and fiscal reforms in response to political and economic instability inhibit investments (Pástor 
and Veronesi, 2013; Chau et al. 2014).  
The present research seeks to assess the role of uncertainty fluctuations on determining 
oil and natural gas GCC stock markets. The aspects of regional and country-specific 
uncertainty have been relatively unexplored for the case of Gulf countries. We decompose the 
volatility of stock prices from the six GCC countries into country specific role and a 
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contribution common to all GCC countries for the periods before and after the blockade on 
Qatar. From a policy perspective, measuring, monitoring and analyzing impact of different 
uncertainty components is of paramount importance (Mumtaz and Musso, 2018). By 
documenting the evolving role of various components of uncertainty in explaining the 
volatility of oil and gas markets, we can better understand developments in oil and gas stock 
markets as well as the financial cycles, and in turn appropriately inform the economic policy 
process in times of geopolitical turmoil. 
Our findings reveal that the contribution of the different uncertainty indicators in 
explaining the volatility of oil and natural gas stocks vary by moving from the period before 
the Qatar diplomatic crisis to the period after the blockade. Prior to the boycott, the regional 
uncertainty plays more explaining oil and natural gas markets than the country-specific 
uncertainty. After the blockade, the regional uncertainty and the country-specific uncertainty 
are likely to exert a pronounced effect on the oil and natural gas markets in all cases, though 
with different sensitivities. We advance throughout this research some elements of 
explanation of these outcomes. 
The article is organised as follows : Section 2 provides some insights about the energy 
cooperation among the GCC countries before and after the 2017 Gulf-Qatar diplomatic crisis. 
Section 3 describes the methodology and the data. The findings from the estimation method 
are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The 2017 Gulf crisis and energy cooperation among the GCC states 
The energy cooperation across GCC countries could pave the way for strengthened 
integration to improve economic efficiency, enhance governance and ensure security of 
supply. The region is facing a prompt surge of the domestic energy demand owing to the 
increased economic growth, wider infrastructure and industrial projects without ignoring the 
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population growth and immigration
2
, raising fuel consumption. The GCC states grew 
remarkably over the last decades, with a combined GDP of  around 2.3 trillion dollars in 2017 
and total exports of approximately 879 billion dollars. Evidently, the 2014-oil price crash has 
adversely affected these economies. The GCC members makes up the world’s biggest energy 
exporting bloc, holding nearly 29.3 percent of the world’s global oil reserves and 
approximately 23 percent of its natural gas reserves. In short, GCC countries depend 
substantially on the hydrocarbons. Before the oil price decline of mid-2014, the hydrocarbon 
sector accounted for 80 percent of its exports and fiscal revenues. Collectively, the GCC 
states have so far fulfilled noticeable milestones including the achievement of a regional free 
trade zone and a customs union. This cooperation, nevertheless, has not yet attained its full 
potential. The GCC grid interdependence represents the bloc’s most successful energy 
cooperation project to date. But since 2016, no additional efforts have been undertaken to spur 
the economic benefits while attempting to achieve a complete regional electricity market.  
Moreover, opportunities exist for cooperation in the gas sector, easing use and trade of wide 
resources across the region. All GCC states (except Qatar) suffer from a shortage of natural 
gas. Oman and the UAE are highly influenced, and started importing natural gas from Qatar. 
This implies it would be fruitful to develop cross-border pipeline projects.  
Normally, the current conditions may be ripe to motivate regulators to make further 
efforts toward regional energy cooperation. First of all, the GCC economic downturn owing to 
the global decline in oil prices has led to a deeper burden on governments, yielding them to 
rethink energy prices. In addition, the heightened domestic pressures to stimulate economic 
diversification, coupled with international pressure post-COP21 to minimize carbon dioxide 
emissions and limit climate change may be regarded as incentives to cooperate.
3
  Nonetheless, 
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The total population of GCC increased from 23 million in 1990 to 53 million in 2016. 
3
It must be stressed that collapsing energy prices prompt the region exhibiting greatest per-capita emissions in 
the globe, with Qatar ranking first. 
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regardless of the projected benefits that could be fulfilled through energy cooperation across 
GCC, a variety of barriers  are still harm the efforts to speed up cooperation. Political will and 
geopolitical uncertainty may be considered as the major challenges.  
Energy policies across the GCC region remain unstable. Each state has roles for 
independent regulatory bodies, and a different market structure to meet security of supply. 
Energy is a requisite to stimulate economic development at the national level. Countries must 
ensure their own interests and responsibilities are protected in an attempt to conduct joint 
projects. There is no doubt that the recent Gulf crisis has prompted a markedly turmoil in the 
intra-Gulf relations. The consequences of such economic and diplomatic upheaval will be 
difficult to conquer even if the Gulf states manage to find a way out. But it must be reminded 
that from the beginning, the Gulf Cooperation Council lacked a definite foundation, which 
gives an explanation of its failure to develop a comprehensive regional organization to 
circumvent crises among its members. While social cooperation between the GCC nations has 
often been great, the state-level interactions have been relatively modest, at least with respect 
the institutionalization of agreements that were concluded among the member states. But 
other regional organizations including the European Union, for instance, have much less 
social cooperation but are highly institutionalized regarding the economic cooperation. This 
has been far more successful at stimulating political consensus. In other words, the GCC 
lacks the required legislative and bureaucratic arms to successfully implement collaborative 
policies and appropriate decision-making processes. Beyond the several challenges facing the 
GCC states over the last years (over-reliance on oil and gas,
4
 asset price bubbles resulting 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
4
The global oil prices have often played a significant role in driving growth rates, and in turn income levels of 
these economies. The sharp oil price collapse in mid-2014 turned the account surpluses into noticeable deficits in 
most cases, putting huge pressures on foreign exchange reserves.  
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from higher oil price
5
, economic diversification, stubbornly low productivity, see Macaron 
(2017) for more details), the GCC, faces more than anything else, a political challenge. In 
fact, geopolitical developments, unstable relations within the Gulf region, and more 
importantly a protracted diplomatic rift between Qatar and its Arab Gulf neighbors could slow 
progress toward greater GCC integration and cause a broader erosion of confidence in Qatar 
and the rest of the GCC countries, harming business in general, and energy sector in 
particular. The Qatar diplomatic crisis puts the accomplishment of GCC reform plans in 
doubt, and could in turn undermine the GCC structural reforms aiming at diversifying their 
economies.
6
 
To spur energy collaboration, it is of utmost importance to build more trust. It is time 
for these countries toresolve their differences and work seriously on strengthening the GCC 
economic outcomes in an uncertain global economy. If the political will is established, the 
implementation of energy cooperation will follow without any difficulty. 
3. Methodology and data 
To determine country-specific and regional uncertainty proxies, we apply a dynamic 
factor model with stochastic volatility and time-varying factor loadings. The factor model is 
expressed as follows : 
it
G
t
G
i
C
t
C
iit eFBFBX  (1) 
where itX  is a panel of oil and natural gas stock price indices for GCC countries. This panel 
of data is summarised by three main components: a set of factors common to all countries         
                                                          
5
The higher oil prices that prevailed before the oil price crash of mid-2014 prompted asset price bubbles that 
posed significant risk to the GCC macroeconomic stability. 
6
The huge reliance of the GCC economies to the hydrocarbon sector urges a vigorous and speedy 
implementation of structural reforms.   
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It must be stressed that equations (2) and (3) enable the global and cross-country factors to 
have a dynamic relationship. The idiosyncratic component has an AR transition equation 
denoted as: 
ititjit
J
j
jit hee 
2
1
1


 (4) 
where )1,0(.~,, Nee it
C
t
G
t  . Based on Mumtaz and Thedoridis (2015)’s study, we enable for 
time-varying factor loadings. Collecting the factor loadings at time t in a 
matrix  GitGitit BBB , , the law of motion depicting their time-variation can be expressed as 
follows : 
t
B
iitit UQBB
é
1
)(1   (5) 
where the error terms in equations (2), (3), (4) and (5) are heteroscedastic. Following Mumtaz 
and Musso (2018), the error covariance matrices in the VAR models (2), (3) and (4) are 
denoted as : 
')()( 11  AJHAJ Jt
J
t
(6) 
where .,CGJ  AJ are lower triangular and 
J
tH  are diagonal matrices given by : 
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The time-varying volatility is detected by 
J
t with Sk representing scaling factors for k = 1,…, 
K. The total volatilites evolve as AR(1) process expressed as follows: 
J
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)(lnln 1 (8) 
Equation (6) indicates that the volatility component detects the entire volatility in the 
orthogonalized residuals of the VAR models. As claimed by Carriero et al. (2015), the 
common volatility can be defined as the average of the variance of the shocks with equal 
weight given to individual volatilities. We should point out at this stage that the errors to these 
equations represent the shocks to global and country-specific factors. Therefore 
C
t
G
t  , detect 
the average volatility of the unpredictable part of the common and the cross-country 
components. These volatilities can be considered as relevant indicators uncertainty associated 
with regional and country-specfic conditions. 
We suppose that the variance of the shocks to the idiosyncratic component to be 
heteroscedastic with ith  evolving as a stochastic volatility process. We have : 
itiitiiit qhbah 
2
1
1lnln   (9) 
The structure of the model suggests that the unconditional variance of each variable can be 
expressed as a function of ),( CGJ
J
t   and th . Specifically, 
)var()var()()var()()var( 22 it
C
t
C
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t
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itit eFBFBX  (10) 
where the variance terms in the equation (10) are measured by means of a  standard VAR 
formula for unconditional variance. These variance terms are time-varying as they are 
functions of 
C
t
G
t  , and ith . 
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Note that the volatility of each variable in our panel is determined by uncertainty that is 
common to all countries, an uncertainty that is country-specific as well as a residual term that 
detects data uncertainty. More accurately, we try to identify how volatilities of oil and natural 
gas equities for each country are driven by region-specificor country-specific uncertainty. The 
time-varying factor loadings permit to evaluate the dynamic contributions of each of the 
regional, cross-country and idiosyncratic components.  
In short, this study assesses whether the uncertainty factors determining the volatility 
of GCC oil and natural gas stock prices have been changed over the period witnessing 
heightened uncertainty over the 2017 Gulf crisis. To test this hypothesis, we determine the 
uncertainty contributing factors for two equal periods prior to and post-the blockade on Qatar. 
The boycott decision was on 05 June 2017, which we subsequently view as the announcement 
day. So, this study compares the determining forces of the volatility of oil and natural gas 
stock markets over equal periods before the boycott (Period 1: from 03 April 2016 to 04 June 
2017; 428 observations), and after the boycott (Period 2: from 06 June 2017 to 07 August 
2018; 428 observations).The data of oil and natural gas stock indices were collected from 
DataStream (Thomson Reuters). We transformed all the variables by taking natural 
logarithms to correct for heteroskedasticity and dimensional differences. Descriptive statistics 
for series are reported in Table 1. We note that the volatility increased for all the stock 
markets under study by moving from period 1 (i.e., before the blockade, Panel A, Table 1) to 
period 2 (i.e., after the blockade, Panel B, Table 1), with large extent for Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar. The least volatile stock market is that of Oman. After the 2017 Gulf crisis, we notice 
that all the equities are likely to be negatively skewed, with the exception of Oman and 
Bahrain. Such heterogeneity in this times of market stress highlight that market participants 
may enjoy portfolio diversification opportunities. But, despite the importance of these results, 
the latter do not inform us about the contributors of this change in the volatile behaviors of oil 
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and gas markets. We try in the following to identify the uncertainty driving forces of the 
volatility of oil and gas markets before and after the blockade. 
 
Table 1. Statistical properties of oil and natural gas stock returns by country 
 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Panel A : Period 1 : Before the blockade on Qatar 
 Mean  0.001916 0.000806 0.001621  1.10E-05 -0.001023  0.002128 
 Median  0.031738 0.030342 0.041192 -0.002028  0.077655  0.031826 
 Maximum  0.166263 0.116793 0.145847  0.438927  1.677135  0.387325 
 Minimum -0.698647 -1.158281 -0.509544 -0.338575 -4.582749 -0.823530 
 Std. Dev.  0.123620 0.108400 0.125771  0.181631  0.374123  0.162142 
 Skewness -1.933086 -4.106304 -1.801694  0.244617 -5.185766 -1.539648 
 Kurtosis  8.157172 7.85176 6.169026  4.225992  58.77320  6.920278 
 Jarque-Bera  740.8627 192.9533 41.06505  31.07290  57391.57  443.1699 
 Probability  0.000000 0.000000 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
Panel B : Period 2 : After the blockade on Qatar 
 Mean  0.000652  0.000338 -0.001613  0.000316  0.003419 -0.000778 
 Median  0.039204  0.040166  0.041048 -0.003971  0.072908  0.042192 
 Maximum  0.164509  0.127914  0.133137  0.537433  1.684439  0.535590 
 Minimum -0.456515 -1.625613 -0.589045 -0.534400 -4.278205 -1.631654 
 Std. Dev.  0.125851  0.131264  0.123171  0.297125  0.337480  0.214524 
 Skewness 1.122593 -5.588247 1.676758 - 0.603860 -5.357073 -2.740098 
 Kurtosis  3.759154  5.964327  5.930341  4.970826  65.29266  16.14385 
 Jarque-Bera  100.1730  59.44518  35.36880  70.03692  71247.18  3616.481 
 Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1.  Estimates of uncertainty components 
The uncertainty measure derived from the dynamic factor model is displayed in Figure 
1 by the posterior estimates of the common standard deviation of the shocks to the global 
factors 2
1
)( Gt , along with various selected events, either relating to major economic events 
or associated to major geopolitical events with significant economic implications such as the 
US presidential elections and 2017 Gulf crisis with implications for global oil prices. We 
interpret this as an uncertainty indicator that is common across the countries under 
consideration.Notably, the measure of the regional uncertainty attained its highest levels with 
the Trump’s win in US presidential elections in November 2016,  with the Riyadh Summit in 
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late May 2017 when many world leaders, including Donald Trump visited the region, giving 
great support for Saudi Arabia’s efforts in fighting against states and groups allied with Iran and 
the Muslim Brotherhood, on June 5 with the annoucement of the decision by Saudi Arabia, 
UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt to suspend diplomatic ties with Qatar, and after 30 January 2018 
when the United States-Qatar Strategic Dialogue meeting was held (see Panels A and B, 
Fig.1). Accounting for about 40 percent of global oil reserves and 24 percent of proven gas 
reserves, GCC countries benefited from an increased demand in emerging markets. Given 
this, it is not surprising that a diplomatic row consisting of cutting transport links and trade 
ties with Qatar exacerbates the uncertainty leading to reverberations in the oil and gas 
market.But the Qatar-GCC diplomatic crisis has intensified concerns about oil and gas supply 
routes.Fig.1 clearly indicates that the uncertainty across GCC countries increases more 
markedly after the Qatar diplomatic crisis. 
 
Fig. 1. The estimate of the standard deviation of shocks to the common factors 
Panel A : Period 1 : Before the blockade on Qatar 
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Panel B : Period 2 : After the blockade on Qatar 
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The posterior estimates of the common standard deviation of shocks to country-
specific factors 2
1
)( Gt , for c=1,…6 are outlined in Fig. 2. The cross-country estimates of 
financial uncertaintyindicates that GCC oil and gas stock market uncertainty is highly 
persistent for all countries before and after the blockade (Panels A and B, Fig. 2). OPEC 
serves as apotentiel determining factor of this high uncertainty surrounding energy industries. 
The OPEC’s principal objectives of sufficient supply and stable prices are to be fulfilled by a 
quota system which enables each member a production in relation to its proven reserves. The 
OPEC member states account for 40 percent of global crude oil production, 55 per cent of 
crude oil exports, and more than two-thirds of the world’s crude oil reserves. Despite the 
OPEC’s power in the oil market, the regulation of individual production quotas can have a 
significant effect on the global oil market price. According to Zietlow (2015), the oil price 
originates from resource pragmatism and nationalism which prompt heightened supply 
uncertainty. OPEC can be viewed only as a vehicle to expand the interests of its member 
states. Nonetheless, the individual market power of countries (in particular the core OPEC, 
i.e., Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Qatar) may yield to a breakdown of the cartel-like 
structure. In this context, Dibooglu and AlGudhea (2007) argued that OPEC member states 
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deviate from the agreed production quotas which can be perceived as a signal of the increased 
instability of the group, and may in turn, lead to an excessive oil price volatility. Another 
uncertainty factor that underpins oil and gas stock market volatility is geopolitics. 
Geopolitical risks cause disruptions in major oil-producing countries, raising critical questions 
about the ability of these countries to supply the global market in the long-term in periods of 
heightened crisis or tensions which would have a strong effect on oil price dynamics. The 
significant oversupply of oil markets has cushioned oil prices from a lot of the geopolitical 
turmoil in the world over the past few years. Nevertheless, with the markets rebalancing, 
geopolitical instability may exert a more pronounced impact on oil prices in the future. 
Moreover, some studies have suggested that oil and gas investments are significantly 
impacted by geopolitical stability, within-border conflicts and external conflicts, altogether 
documenting a negative causality from geopolitical uncertainty to investment (for example, 
Brandon and Yook 2012 ; Bøe and Jordal 2016). In this context, Fig. 2 clearly indicates that 
oil and gas price indices have been affected by the 2016 US presidential elections. Oil prices 
moved in volatile territory after the Trump’s win in the US presidential elections. It is 
expected that the escalating trade war could prompt a great fallout for the oil market. Besides, 
the president Trump called for lower oil prices by increasing supply. Donald Trump tweeted 
in November 2018 ‘Hopefully, Saudi Arabia and OPEC will not be cutting oil production.’ In 
this context, some commentators speculate that Riyadh may be more willing than usual to pay 
heed to President  Donald Trump’s call, after the reputational threat it suffered following the 
death of Saudi journalist Khashoggi. Yet, Saudi Arabia has actually raised its production even 
modestly since in response to Trump’s call. Accordingly, the Bank of America recently 
described a pessimistic scenario in which the possibility of an emerging market downturn 
happened at a time when OPEC raised production, a combination that could undoubtedly push 
oil down to 60 dollars. Interestingly, the Qatar-GCC diplomatic crisis and the resulting 
16 
 
challenges seem to be a factor associated to substantial increases in the common financial 
uncertainty (Panel B, Fig.1). More interestingly, we note that the 2017 Gulf crisis has 
exacerbated financial uncertainty with large extent for Qatar and the boycotting 
countries (Panel B, Fig. 2). This is dominantly due to the paramount importance of the region 
for global supplies. The increased volatility of the region has prominent implications on the 
supply of oil and gas. The stability of oil producing countries is crucial to maintain a global 
supply line and then to mitigate uncertain exposure. 
 
        Fig. 2. The estimate of the standard deviation of shocks to country-specific factors 
Panel A : Period 1 : Before the blockade on Qatar 
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Panel B : Period 2 : After the blockade on Qatar 
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
II III IV I II III
2017 2018
BAHRAIN
0
10
20
30
40
50
II III IV I II III
2017 2018
UAE
0
2
4
6
8
II III IV I II III
2017 2018
OMAN
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
II III IV I II III
2017 2018
QATAR
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
II III IV I II III
2017 2018
SAUDI ARABIA
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
II III IV I II III
2017 2018
KUWAIT
 
 
4.2. Variance decomposition 
To assess the degree to which shocks to various uncertainty components drive the 
volatility of oil and gas stock price indices for each GCC country, we utilize forecast error 
variance decompositions. In other words, based on equation (10), the unconditional variance 
is decomposed into region-specific and country-specific contributions with the residual 
capturing the idiosyncratic component (or the variable-specific volatiliy). Table 2displays the 
average variance decomposition for the GCC oil and gas stock price indices. More 
particularly, the table displays the average contributions over the whole sample period of each 
uncertainty component to oil and gas stock market for each Gulf country, and for the whole 
sample of GCC countries. We show that idiosyncratic uncertainty explains the total volatility 
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of oil and gas stock prices, more than the region-specific uncertainty and the country-specific 
uncertainty ; this is valid for the two periods under study. Before the blockade, on average for 
all the countries, the idiosyncratic components explains most the volatility of oil and natural 
gas stock prices, with common uncertainty component corresponding to the second most 
important driving force. The importance of common uncertainty in driving the volatility of oil 
and gas stock markets before the blockade can be explained by the increased financial sector 
integration among Gulf countries. Highly motivated by the necessity to enhance efficiency, 
GCC countries have taken prominent steps these last decades toward achieveing appropriate 
financial regulation and corporate governance measures, which have in turn enabled to 
improve convergence across GCC financial systems. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2017) explored 
the extent of financial integration in the Gulf using capital flow data and equity prices. The 
study revealed that there is an improvement in regional financial integration. In contrast, and 
after the blockade on Qatar, oil and gas volatility seems dominantly driven by the specific-
country uncertainty and the idiosyncratic component, while the impact of the region-specific 
uncertainty appears less pronounced (with the exception of Kuwait and Oman). This 
highlights that the Qatar diplomatic crisis can be viewed as a signal for failure in regional 
integration among GCC countries.The Gulf States appear to move from the stage of 
cooperation to confront foreign threats to another stage where all states will seek their own 
security and protection against one another. In response to the blockade, Qatar rebuild its 
trade ties and food supply chain to pass round imports previously received through Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE. Qatar accelerated efforts to further diversify sources of imports and 
external financing.Qatar withstand the harmful effects of the blockade as it growingly 
emphasizes economic relationships outside the Gulf region.This has allowed Doha to replace 
import trade that came by land from Saudi Arabia and by sea from the UAE. In brief, the 
2017 Gulf crisis forced Qatar to think and act more swiftly to determine new supply routes 
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and trade partners. Doha cultivated new supply chains via Oman while receiving great 
assistance from Turkey and Iran. The Turkishpresident has been a major supporter of Doha 
since the quartetcutties and imposed boycott against Qatar .Also and according to Qatar’s 
Chamber,  Turkey is one of Qatar’s major  customers for non-oil exports.  Similarly, Qatar’s 
pledge of aid to Turkey has strengthened the two countries’ alliance. In August 2018, the emir 
of Qatar pledged to invest 15 billion dollars in Turkey, which grapples with a currency crisis 
that made the lira collapse by about 45 percent against the US dollar. In the sameorder of 
idears, Doha seesits links with Tehran as vital to its economic and securityinterests. Qatar’s 
ties to Iran are of paramount importance to safeguard itsnaturalresources, as the countries 
share the biggest gas field in the world. Since the blockade, Iran and Qatar ties have 
improved. As a response to the 2017 Gulf crisis, Iran voicedits support for the Qatari 
government, consolidating its alliance with the small Gulf state. Iran’s trade with Doha totaled 
250 million dollars in2018, registering a sharp rise of 2.5 percent compared with 2017 
(Bouoiyour and Selmi 2018). Overall, the recent Gulf crisis and its resulted diplomatic and 
economic challenges with other GCC countries has significantly sped up Qatari plans and has 
also strengthened the motivation to take a close attention to self-sufficiency. The fact that the 
major uncertainty factor contributing to the variance of oil and gas stock prices of Kuwait and 
Oman is still the common component can be attributed to their neutral reaction amid Qatar 
crisis. Rather than following Saudi Arabia and its allies, Kuwait and Oman have chosen to 
stay resolutely above the fray. The neutrality of thesetwo Gulf countries providedleverage for 
Qatar, albeit without direct support. But it must be mentionned at this stage that 
Kuwait appears as the main mediator among the warring parties, and Oman endorsed 
diplomacy while improving its links with Qatar. Kuwait has attempted to mediate the spat 
between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors. Its good links with all parties of the GCC and equal 
distance from each of them have enabled Kuwait to act in a neutral manner. But it must be 
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mentioned that Oman is uninvolved in the 2017 Gulf crisis and cannot undertake such a 
mission because of intense relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE as a consequence of 
strong Oman’s ties with Iran. In fact, Saudi Arabia has proclaimed its displeasure with the 
sultanate’s increased linkas with Iran across several sectors such as energy, trade, defense, 
and investment. In addition, Saudi Arabia and UAE’ fears about strengthened Omani-Iranian 
relations may prevent the Saudis and Emiratis from viewing Muscat as neutral in the current 
Gulf crisis.  
Table 2. Contribution of the region-specific, country-specific and idiosyncratic uncertainty 
components to the variance of GCC oil and gas stock prices 
 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE 
Panel A : Period 1 : Before the blockade on Qatar 
 Common 
uncertainty 
24% 33% 29% 38% 41% 48% 
 Country-specific 
uncertainty 
17% 
 
21% 
 
18% 
 
14% 
 
22% 
 
19% 
 
Idiosyncratic 
component 
59% 
 
46% 
 
53% 
 
48% 
 
37% 
 
33% 
 
Panel B : Period 2 : After the blockade on Qatar 
 Common 
uncertainty 
19% 
 
30% 
 
31% 
 
22% 
 
24% 
 
26% 
 
 Country-specific 
uncertainty 
22% 
 
24% 
 
27% 
 
35% 
 
31% 
 
32% 
 
Idiosyncratic 
component 
59% 
 
46% 
 
42% 
 
43% 
 
45% 
 
42% 
 
 
Our obtained findings have relevant policy implications for Gulf countries. In fact, the 
consideration of distinct sources of uncertainty can appropriately inform the changing energy 
landscape and the optimal policy reaction. For instance, if the volatility of oil and gas markets 
is mainly determined by the country-specific uncertainty component, a range of domestic 
policy measures might in turn represent the most effective response to mitigate possible 
harmful consequences. In contrast, when the oil and natural gas markets are predominantly 
explained by the common uncertainty, this might be beyond the control of national policy 
authorities if acting in isolation and might needs under certain scenarios, coordinated policy 
responses at regional level. But with the recent political developments amid the blockade on 
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Qatar which exacerbate political and economic uncertainty, coordinated policies among the 
GCC countries become hard, if not impossible, to be achieved. This is because the problem 
here goes beyond the economic and financial context. It enters into logic of Sunni world 
domination. Indeed, the Qatar’s challenge to Saudi Arabia is exacerbated by the fact that it 
adheres to Wahhabi creed. More accurately, Qatar’s alternative adaptation of Wahhabism 
coupled with a long-standing links with the Muslim Brotherhood, make its relationship with 
Saudi Arabia more complicated and upraise it to a serious threat (Bouoiyour and Selmi, 
2018). 
In sum, the changing role of the various uncertainty components derived from the 
factor model to explain the volatility of oil and gas stock markets in Gulf statesunderscore the 
paramount importance of monitoring both the common and country-specific uncertainty, in 
order to better understand developments in oil and gas price fluctuations and financial cycles, 
and then well inform the economic policy process. With the multiplicity of oil supply 
disruptions resulted from geopolitical events, such accurate information may help oil and gas 
producers to effectively counterbalance the supply losses.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper addresses whether uncertainty dynamics that are common among GCC 
countries matters more or less for oil and gas stock market volatility than country-specific 
uncertainty shocks. More interestingly, we test if the 2017 Qatar-Gulf crisis slow the progress 
toward greater energy cooperation in the GCC.  
Using a dynamic model with time-varying factor loadings and stochastic volatility, we 
show that the contributors of the volatility oil and gas shares vary over over time. Before the 
blockade on Qatar, the volatility of oil and gas stock prices is determined first and foremost 
by the common uncertainty component. However, the contribution of cross-country 
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uncertainty appears more pronounced after the economic and diplomatic boycott of Doha. 
Such outcome is not surprising as confusion gains ascendancy in the energy and shipping 
markets since Saudi Arabia and its allies abruptly cut diplomatic and economic ties 
with Qatar. The largest class of oil tankers
7
 frequently travel back-to-back around several 
GCC ports to load about two million barrels of crude oil per month. The UAE’s al-Fujairah 
port is the major hub for bunkering and energy trading activities where ships transit on their 
way to Asia, Europe, and North America. Since the Qatar-GCC crisisstarted, these 
supertankers were left with unforeseeable guidance on the restrictions they might face in their 
regular routes. Accordingly, the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2017) claimed that the 
Gulf spat led to logistical headaches with growing shipping costs.This highlights that the 2017 
Gulf crisis has significantly strengthened the motivation of each Gulf country to take a close 
attention to self-sufficiency. The Gulf States seem to move from the stage of cooperation 
under the banner of the Gulf Cooperation Council to defy foreign threats to another stage 
where all countries will seek their own energy security and protection against one 
another.Either business was or was not disrupted, the disorder regarding trade routes would 
have important implications.  Europe and Asia will most likely rethink how much their 
economies should rely on energy resources from the Gulf market. Qatar is a global leader 
in liquefied natural gas (LNG), offering 30 percent of the world’s LNG supplies, mostly to 
Asian and European countries. This implies that a disruption in the production or shipment of 
Qatari LNG could have a significant effects on European economies, forcing them to rely 
instead on Russian natural gas, a move they would like to bypass considering the political 
upheaval with Moscow. Indeed, there has been a consciousness among all sides that a 
distruption in the global energy market would precipitate alarm bells, especially in Asia and 
European countries.  
                                                          
7
The very large ship for transporting oil carrying more than 100,000 tonnes of oil. 
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